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ABSTRACT. One of the key determinants of success in managing natural resources is “institutional fit,” i.e., how well the suite of
required actions collectively match the scale of the environmental problem. The effective management of pest and pathogen threats to
plants is a natural resource problem of particular economic, social, and environmental importance. Responses to incursions are managed
by a network of decision makers and managers acting at different spatial and temporal scales. We applied novel network theoretical
methods to assess the propensity of growers, local industry, local state government, and state and national government head offices to
foster either within- or across-scale coordination during the successful 2001 Australian response to the outbreak of the fungal pathogen
black sigatoka (Mycosphaerella fijiensis). We also reconstructed the response network to proxy what that network would look like today
under the Australian government’s revised response system. We illustrate a structural move in the plant biosecurity response system
from one that was locally driven to the current top-down system, in which the national government leads coordination of a highly
partitioned engagement process. For biological incursions that spread widely across regions, nationally rather than locally managed
responses may improve coordination of diverse tasks. However, in dealing with such challenges of institutional fit, local engagement
will always be critical in deploying flexible and adaptive local responses based on a national system. The methods we propose detect
where and how network structures foster cross-scale interactions, which will contribute to stronger empirical studies of cross-scale
environmental governance.
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INTRODUCTION
The coordination of actions across natural resource problems
requires management structures that collectively fit the spatial
and temporal scales of the challenge at hand (Young 2002,
Brondizio et al. 2009). We use “scale” to refer to the different
spatial spheres of influence. At local scales, communities with
good local knowledge may self-organize and regulate to ensure
that their resources are used sustainably (Ostrom 2005). However,
the longevity of local rules and behaviors depends on how they
are nested in broader systems of government-led processes
(Ostrom 2005, Agrawal et al. 2013, Mansbridge 2014). Assessing
“institutional fit,” i.e., how well environmental management
matches the underpinning scale(s) of problems, is an emerging
scholarly ambition that stands to identify institutional gaps and
practical alternatives (see Robinson et al. 2011, Lebel et al. 2013).
One approach to assessing institutional fit is through carefully
designed questionnaires to measure the capacities of various
stakeholders (Lebel et al. 2013). Good capacities to solve
problems of fit can be both observed in, and facilitated by,
networks that predispose across-scale interactions. Therefore, a
complementary approach to analyzing capacities is to analyze
scale matching by measuring the across-scale relationships
between stakeholders operating at different scales. Recent studies
have contributed to emerging methods of analyzing scale
matching (Bergsten et al. 2014, Guerrero et al. 2015). We built on
this work, treating governance as an interlinked network of
decision makers and managers (Lubell 2013) and identifying not
just if  across-scale coordination happens, but where it does so.  
Pest and pathogen threats to plants, referred to as plant
biosecurity, constitute a natural resource management issue of
particular economic, social, and environmental importance
(Pejchar and Mooney 2009). Without management controls, it is
estimated that exotic pests, weeds, and pathogens have the
potential to inflict preharvest yield losses for global agriculture
ranging from 44%-54% in wheat, 64-80% in rice, 58%-75% in
maize, 73%-80% in potatoes, and 49%-69% in soybeans (Oerke
2006). Even with controls, losses average 28%, 37%, 31%, 40%,
and 26% in wheat, rice, maize, potatoes, and soybeans (Oerke
2006). The fungal pathogen rice blast (Magnaporthe oryzae) has
been estimated to cause production losses sufficient to feed 60
million people per year (Pennisi 2010). Weeds have the potential
to reduce global wheat yields by 18%-29% (Oerke 2006). The weed
Striga hermonthica infests up to 40 million hectares, causing
agricultural yield losses valued at US$1 billion and affecting 100
million people (Pennisi 2010). Other weeds such as buffel grass
(Cenchrus ciliaris) have commercial value, yet also have
destructive environment impacts (Marshall et al. 2011).  
Most scholarly attention around plant biosecurity has focused on
furthering our knowledge of pest species and impacts; however,
a focus on how tasks and knowledge are coordinated and shared
is also crucial to ensure effective responses to biological invasions
(Robinson and Whitehead 2003, Esler et al. 2010). Management
requires actions along a full continuum of scales, with localized
on-farm hygiene practices through international agreements on
preborder quarantine forming key parts of control. The spread
of risk occurs across regions and countries; hence, it requires that
management occurs at a scale that matches the spatial and
temporal scale of the risk, e.g., landscapes. Control and
eradication will require containment of the incursion, extended
community engagement, local and regional surveillance and
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diagnostics, and industry and government collaboration.
However, processes to guide effective local response will be
inappropriate for guiding national coordination. One of the key
determinants of success in managing an incursion is how well the
suite of actions combine and coordinate to collectively match the
spatial scale of the environmental problem dynamics to that of
management (Cash et al. 2006, Termeer et al. 2010). We focused
on institutional responses to plant pest and disease incursions
using an Australian case study. “Response” represents one distinct
aspect of overall plant biosecurity and requires a complexity of
activities coordinated across scales. Scale has numerous
definitions in the literature (Sayre 2005). We used scale to refer to
the different spheres of influence that align broadly with the
geographical boundaries of local agricultural enterprises,
governments, and industry representatives.  
The 2001 Australian response to the outbreak of black sigatoka
(Mycosphaerella fijiensis), a banana fungal pathogen that can
reduce banana yields by 50% (Pennisi 2010), provides a unique
experiment for studying the structure of natural resource
management networks across scales. Black sigatoka invoked an
observable, unique response network linking stakeholders at
grower, industry, and governmental scales in an ultimately
successful eradication program. Using Exponential Random
Graph Modeling (ERGM) to analyze the structural properties of
the response, we built on a growing body of literature that seeks
to understand the structure of networks by breaking them down
into simple, theoretically relevant building blocks (Bodin and
Tengö 2012, Lubell et al. 2014, McAllister et al. 2014), specifically
exploring across-scale interactions (Bergsten et al. 2014,
Gallemore et al. 2014, Guerrero et al. 2015). This analysis provides
unique insight into how well a system for managing critical natural
resource problems operates across local, state, and national scales.
The more ad hoc, state government–led institutional framework
in place for the black sigatoka incursion was replaced by a
nationally centralized system in 2005 (Plant Health Australia
2005). To illustrate how Australia’s new system may have
potentially managed an incursion similar to the 2001 black
sigatoka outbreak, we combined the black sigatoka data with new
data sets from a subsequent incursion and the roles and
responsibilities articulated under the new institutional settings.
Black sigatoka and the Australian surveillance and response
system
Black sigatoka is endemic to most banana-growing regions in the
world, and is a major biosecurity threat to the Australian banana
industry (Marín et al. 2003). The disease is widespread in
countries to Australia’s north and is also found on a group of
culturally distinct islands, the Torres Strait, in the far northeast
of Australia. Where black sigatoka is endemic, growers control it
with much higher doses of pesticides than currently used by
Australian producers, resulting in greater production costs and
environmental impacts (Cook et al. 2013). If  the pathogen were
to become established in a major Australian banana-growing
region and eradication was not successful, the increased
management required because of deleafing and higher frequency
of chemical treatments would substantially increase production
costs and likely cause a severe contraction of Australia’s domestic
banana supply (Cook et al. 2013).  
Black sigatoka was first detected in Australia during a 1981 plant
disease survey of the Torres Straits and Cape York Peninsula.
Since then, it has been found nine times on mainland Australia,
all in the state of Queensland’s tropical north. Before 2001, black
sigatoka had never been detected in or near a commercial banana-
growing region (Peterson 2002). In April 2001, black sigatoka was
detected during a routine survey on a number of wild plants within
the Tully Banana Production Area, the largest commercial
banana-growing region in Australia (Peterson 2002, Henderson
et al. 2006, Cook et al. 2013).  
Following the 2001 incursion, extensive surveys found that the
outbreak was restricted to the Tully area. An eradication program
funded by the Australian national government, all banana-
growing state governments (Western Australia, Northern
Territory, Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland), the banana
industry, and growers in the Tully area was finally approved in
June 2001 and commenced in September 2001 (Peterson 2002).
It consisted of an intense deleafing program, the establishment
of an eradication success measure that equated to zero visible
disease, surveillance of all banana stands in the region at 4- to 6-
week intervals by trained monitors, a weekly aerial spraying
campaign, and the destruction of all unmanaged plants.
Compulsory weekly meetings for all growers were also hosted on
four nominated farms, so-called “shed meetings.” Eradication
activities were completed in May 2002, but monitoring continued
over the next 12 months (Peterson 2002). No black sigatoka was
detected after November 2001, and Australia was officially
declared free of the pathogen in March 2005 (Henderson et al.
2006). In total, the eradication cost of the Tully outbreak was
AUD$17 million (Cook et al. 2013).  
In 2001 many of the processes for responding to a plant pest or
pathogen incursion were developed on a case-by-case basis by the
state government in which the incursion occurred. Industry, state,
and national governments negotiated an eradication cost-sharing
deal concurrently with planning for on-ground responses. In 2005
Australia introduced a new nationally coordinated system based
on the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD;
Biosecurity Emergency Preparedness Working Group 2012, Plant
Health Australia 2005, 2011, 2013). EPPRD aimed to partly
standardize how emergency responses are managed, coordinated,
and paid for. A key aim of introducing EPPRD was to ensure
rapid responses to incursions, particularly for responses that
require cooperation across industries and/or state boundaries.  
EPPRD is focused on a model of shared responsibility, which
refers to a working partnership between national and state
governments, industry, and the general community (Beale et al.
2008). To this end EPPRD defines specific roles that have shared
responsibility and accountabilities for reporting and responding
to incursions. These are shared among state government, both in
the head office and at the site of the incursion, industry, and
national government partners (Plant Health Australia 2013). The
key players and the communication pathways for a generic
EPPRD incursion from detection through to the operational
phase of a response are diagrammatically represented in Figure
1 (also see Carnegie and Cooper 2011). This diagram was derived
from the description of the general procedures, management
structure, roles, and information flow system for the handling of
EPPRD incursions at the national, state/territory, and local levels
(Plant Health Australia 2013). As such, this institutional
arrangement represents the intended governance response to an
incursion event.
Ecology and Society 20(1): 67
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss1/art67/
Fig. 1. The Australian Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed: a simplified representation of the key players and the communication
pathways in responding to a biosecurity incursion. Shaded boxes show various committees, management groups, or specialist teams
that are formed when a risk is detected, with participating roles summarized. Unshaded boxes show defined roles that are central to
information transfer within the network. Note that PHA refers to Plant Health Australia, and DoA to the Australian Department
of Agriculture. See Plant Health Australia (2013) for more detail.
METHODS
Bipartite and multilevel networks
The EPPRD biosecurity system structure provides a clear
example for explaining how our networks are defined. The
EPPRD biosecurity system structure (Fig. 1) can be
conceptualized as a network of two type of nodes: individuals
with organizational positions, e.g., state chief  plant health
manager; and committee and working/expert groups, e.g.,
National Management Committee, Scientific Advisory Panel
(Fig. 2). Individuals with organizational positions have a process-
based, structured line of reporting. For example, if  an incursion
is suspected by a local plant health officer, the officer reports it
to the state’s chief  plant health manager. If  a suspected incursion
is not ruled out, various committees and working groups with
statutory guidance for attendance are formed. Although EPPRD
provides guidance on which individuals should attend, the exact
makeup of the various committees and groups will depend on the
social, political, and technical specifics of each incursion.  
Individuals, committees, and working group nodes can be
connected via network ties. Ties between individual
organizational actors, e.g., the state chief  plant health manager,
occur at the micro level, whereas ties between committees and
working/expert groups, e.g., the National Management
Committee, are considered macro level (Fig. 2). Our focus was on
how participation in various committees or working groups
contributes to across-scale management within the multilevel
networks of a plant biosecurity response. From a multilevel
network perspective, this means a focus on only the meso-level
ties (Fig. 2). Conceptually, the subset of meso-level ties can be
represented as a bipartite network, i.e., a network with two distinct
sets of nodes, and with ties only across these sets (Wang et al.
2013).  
Although the EPPRD biosecurity system structure (Fig. 1) allows
for an explanation of our data, our principal data set was for black
sigatoka, for which the response was not managed under EPPRD.
Instead, although nodes and ties were defined as above for the
black sigatoka response network, the types of committees and
working groups that were formed, as well as participation of
individuals in these committees and working groups, were ad hoc
and particular to the black sigatoka case. Response networks for
pest and pathogen incursions both before and after the
introduction of ERPRD have all been shaped by both formal
organizational structures and informal preferences. However, the
influence of informal preferences was much stronger before
ERPRD (Beale et al. 2008).
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Fig. 2. Multilevel biosecurity network, with organizational
actors (micro level) and committees and working groups (macro
level) connected via ties representing processes and formal lines
of communication. Organizational actors are connected to
committees or working groups via ties based on their
participation (meso level, solid ties). For definitions of node
acronyms, see Fig. 1.
Conceptual framework
Conceptually, we built on a growing body of literature that seeks
to understand the structure of networks by linking the
distribution of configurations to theory (Fig. 3). These
configurations are distinctive subpatterns that occur within a
broader network; they are also called subnetworks, motifs, or
building blocks. Bodin and Tengö (2012) and Bodin et al. (2014)
linked social-ecological configurations to concepts of common-
pool resource management. Guerrero et al. (2015) linked
configurations based on social interactions to propensities to
coordinate actions across scales. McAllister et al. (2014) explored
participation of stakeholders in climate change policy forums,
using constellations of forum-stakeholder configurations to
identify stakeholders engaging as advocates.
Fig. 3. Examples where broader theoretical ideas have been
linked subnetwork configurations.
Our interest was in the biosecurity response system’s ability to
work across scales, which we gauged by exploring the balance
between within- and across-scale configurations. In this regard
we built our approach largely on the work of Guerrero et al.
(2015). We sought to identify the types of configurations that are
statistically over-represented or under-represented by stakeholders
at local scales, i.e., grower, local industry, and local state
government representatives, and at state and national government
head office scales. Our conceptual framework explored network
configurations that predispose interactions either within or across
scales (Berardo 2014, Lubell et al. 2014, McAllister et al. 2014),
and in either open or closed configurations (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Conceptual framework. Squares indicate committees or
working groups, and circles indicate stakeholders. Shaded
circles imply stakeholders must be of a given scale, e.g. grower,
local industry or local state government representative, state or
national government.
We refer to open configurations as determining coordination (Fig.
4, right side). These tend to reveal bridging between otherwise-
disconnected actors. Because otherwise-disconnected actors will
tend to be connected to different sets of other actors, bridging
lays the pathways for learning new information or opportunities
(Granovetter 1973, Burt 2004). Rather than a social network, ours
is one of institutional structure. Hence, rather than learning, these
open, bridging ties predispose the ability to coordinate actions
across the response network.  
We refer to closed configurations as collaboration (Fig. 4, left
side). These “cliques” occur where stakeholders participate in the
same sets of committees and working groups. Such configurations
also imply coordinating capacity, but their defining feature is their
potential to additionally foster collaborative environments. These
tightly bonded cliques persist either because participants share
the same operational expectations and knowledge or, if  they
persist for other reasons, the persistence itself  allows participants
time to develop shared operational expectations. Sandström and
Carlsson (2008) link such closure with high levels of cooperation
and efficiency in delivering process-based tasks, particularly when
the actors involved have the same mind set or objectives, i.e.,
homophily.
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Data collection
The network data set includes all relationships between the
individual stakeholders who participated in the response to black
sigatoka in 2001 and their participation in various committees
and working groups directly associated with responding to the
incursion. Although in more recent years record keeping with
respect to incursions has improved dramatically, obtaining such
information from Queensland state and Australian national
governments was not possible for the 2001 event. Instead we
compiled the response network using in-depth interviews with
seven key stakeholders and published accounts (Peterson 2002,
Henderson et al. 2006). The unpublished account in particular
provides details on the stakeholders involved at local scales. The
interviewees confirmed which stakeholders participated in which
committees and working groups, and who the state and national
government representatives were. A purposeful nonproportional
quota sampling strategy (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003) was used
to select participants for interviews to ensure interviewees were
chosen based on their involvement in black sigatoka surveillance,
response, or subsequent review. Nodes in our network data were
defined as individuals, but all individuals were categorized by their
organizational role. Five types of stakeholders participated in our
network: (1) property owners, who managed their agricultural
enterprise; (2) local industry representatives; (3) local state
government representatives, who were employed by the state
government but lived in the region and worked on regional issues;
(4) state government representatives working in administrative
roles in the head office (Brisbane City); and (5) national
government representatives (Australian Department of
Agriculture).  
A second data set was reconstructed to illustrate what the response
network might have potentially looked like if  the incursion had
occurred under the new EPPRD response processes (Plant Health
Australia 2013). Although this data set was not statistically
comparable with our principal data set based on observed
interactions for black sigatoka, the reconstructed data provided
an important tool for contrasting institutional responses for
biosecurity. The approach to creating this reconstructed data set
was to collect new data on industry engagement from a recent
2011 banana pathogen incursion, reuse the grower engagement
from the 2001 black sigatoka outbreak, and then structure and
augment these elements using new EPPRD guidelines:  
. The EPPRD contains duty statements for the key roles and
responsibilities required during an outbreak, as well as
guidelines for establishing and participating in key
committees and working groups (Plant Health Australia
2013). These guidelines were used to generically populate
these roles and committees for our reconstructed EPPRD
response. 
. In 2011, just north of the black sigatoka incursion, an
outbreak of another serious Banana pathogen, Panama
disease (Fusarium oxysporum f.sp. cubense) tropical race 4,
was suspected. This was quickly shown instead to be the
noninfectious disorder known as false Panama (de Beer et
al. 2001), but not before local and state control centers had
been established, including engagement with the banana
industry. Note that EPPRD includes provision for industry
engagement by state and national representatives. Because
the Australia banana industry is overwhelmingly a northern
Queensland industry, we treated all industry representatives
as a form of local engagement. State government situation
reports detail engagement with industry and their
participation in committees. Although EPPRD shows the
structure for how to engage with industry, the data from the
false Panama incursion were used to proxy how industry
bodies might participate in the hypothetical reconstructed
EPPRD response network. 
. In 2001, 131 growers were engaged in 4 groups through
regular shed meetings with a local state government
representative and a local industry representative in
attendance. To proxy grower engagement for the
reconstructed EPPRD response, we used the same 131
growers engaged in 2001 and likewise used the 2001 structure
of shed meetings. The only assumed difference was that
during the black sigatoka response the local state
government representative was a very active, well-connected
local diagnostic expert, but for the reconstructed EPPRD
response, we assumed that a designated local industry liaison
officer attended shed meetings instead, as guided by EPPRD
(Plant Health Australia 2005). 
Figure 5 depicts the data sets graphically. Table 1 totals the number
of stakeholders involved in both the observed 2001 and the
reconstructed EPPRD response.
Fig. 5. Graphical depiction of network data for (a) the 2001
black sigatoka outbreak and (b) the reconstructed Emergency
Plant Pest Response Deed response. Squares indicate
committees or working groups, and circles indicate individuals
who participated in the response. Note that much of this
information is considered sensitive; hence, the figure
deliberately conceals detail.
Exponential random graph modeling
Our approach built on advances in both statistical network
methodology (ERGM; Frank and Strauss 1986, Wasserman and
Pattison 1996, Robins and Morris 2007, Wang et al. 2013) and
emerging approaches to its interpretation (Lubell et al. 2012, 2014,
McAllister et al. 2014, Guerrero et al. 2015). ERGMs assume
networks are the result of a stochastic process, treating an
observed network as a single observation that can be compared
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with a distribution of all possible networks with a core set of
identical characteristics, e.g., number of nodes and ties (Robins
et al. 2007a). This allows for statistical interpretations on whether
selected configurations are observed in a network more or less
frequently than could be expected by chance alone. ERGMs allow
for statistical inferences to be made without the need for multiple
networks for comparison.
Table 1. Number of participants across all committees and
working groups.
 
Scale of participant Black sigatoka
(Mycosphaerella
fijiensis), 2001
Reconstructed
Emergency Plant
Pest Response
Deed response
Property owners (growers) 131 131
Local state-government
representatives
9 7
State government (head office) 5 21
National government 1 9
Local industry representatives 6 12
Total 152 180
In addition, most configurations in networks can be nested within
other configurations. A configuration with four connected nodes
also contains within it configurations with three connected nodes.
ERGMs assess the relative frequency of configurations in a
network given the observed frequency of other configurations,
including those that are nested. In our case, ERGMs allowed us
to test, e.g., the abundance of within-scale coordination
configurations (Fig. 4) given the observed abundance of across-
scale collaborative configurations (Fig. 4). Note that in making
accurate assessments of the representation of these
configurations in our data, we controlled for the general level of
activity displayed by each scale of stakeholder. This baseline
activity can also be interpreted as a measure of how active
stakeholders have been in the response network.  
ERGMs estimate a coefficient for each configuration included in
a model. The coefficients reflect the chances of observing ties
between nodes, but their values cannot be interpreted directly.
Instead, the signs of the coefficients quantify whether
configurations are observed more, i.e., positive coefficient, or less,
i.e., negative coefficient, than can be expected by chance alone,
and the t scores of the coefficients quantify whether this
discrepancy between observation and expectation is statistically
significant (Wang et al. 2009). One of the limitations of the
ERGM approach is that where there is collinearity among model
predictors, the maximum-likelihood algorithm used for
estimating coefficients can fail to converge (Robins et al. 2007b).
With the current methods, the selection of which configurations
to include in an ERGM is therefore biased by which
configurations allow model convergence. We took an applied
approach, utilizing the software pNet for bipartite networks
(Wang et al. 2009).
RESULTS
Our ERGMs included as many configurations from our
conceptual framework as was feasible while allowing convergence
(Figs. 4, 6). These configurations represent the distinction
between within- and across-scale interactions for each scale/type
of network participant (Table 1). The black sigatoka ERGM also
included baseline activity configurations for each type of
participant. In total, 15 configurations were included in the
model. Of these 15, 7 were either significantly over-represented
or under-represented compared with what could be explained by
chance alone (Fig. 6). Industry’s within-scale coordinating role
was significantly positive. Across-scale coordination was negative
for state government, both in the head office and in the local
region, and the national government. The baseline activity
configurations were significantly positive for the local and state
government head office and negative at the property scale. Note
that the property owners’ low level of activity is indicative of the
fact that while they were important players in managing on-the-
ground activities, they had only limited participation in the
institutional arrangements for eradication.  
Different convergence properties allowed for an ERGM for the
reconstructed data that included 19 configurations, 14 of which
were also included in the black sigatoka model. Of the 19
configurations, 11 were significantly over-represented or under-
represented compared with what could be explained by chance
alone (Fig. 6). Property scale and state government both in the
head office and in the local region had positive coefficients for
within-scale coordination. Property, state (head office), and
national governments had negative coefficients for across-scale
coordination, whereas industry had a positive coefficient. The
coefficient for the national government’s across-scale
collaboration configuration was positive. The baseline activity
configurations were negative for property and industry, and
positive for the national government.
DISCUSSION
Black sigatoka, 2001
The 2001 Australian eradication of black sigatoka was the first
time a fungal pathogen had ever been eradicated from a
commercial banana-growing district. Success was credited to
effective partnerships (Henderson et al. 2006). The response
mobilized significant local action, with local industry and growers
making substantial contributions to the cause of eradication.
Building on recent studies that use statistical network modeling
(Gallemore et al. 2014, Guerrero et al. 2015, Lubell 2015), we
explored whether the interactions observed in the institutional
response for black sigatoka predisposed across-scale governance.  
Our key metric for measuring the propensity for across-scale
governance in response network was the balance between
interactions indicating within-scale compared with across-scale
interactions. Of the five types of stakeholders represented, i.e.,
property owners, government at local, state, and national scales,
and industry, none had significantly more across-scale
interactions than expected, although three had significantly less.
In contrast, no stakeholder type had fewer within-scale
interactions than expected, whereas industry stakeholders had
more within-scale interactions, which is linked to a capacity to
reach decisions and resolve conflict (Sandström and Carlsson
2008). The observed lack of across-scale interactions for local,
state, and national government may limit the capacity to solve
problems collectively (Sandström and Carlsson 2008) and the
potential to respond at multiple levels. In other words, the network
Ecology and Society 20(1): 67
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss1/art67/
Fig. 6. Summary of Exponential Random Graph Modeling (ERGM) results. Counts show observed number of
configurations in both networks; negative/positive ERGM parameters measure whether observed counts are fewer/
greater than expected by chance alone, with t statistics used to access the statistical significance. As in Figure 4, shaded
circles in configurations imply that stakeholders must be of a given scale, e.g., grower, local industry or local state
government representative, state or national government. EPPRD indicates Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed.
accommodates decisions to be made within scales, but did not
predispose coordination of those decisions across scales. The
obvious question is this: if  the network failed to predispose across-
scale interactions and if  across-scale interactions are important,
then how did the eradication response network succeed?  
Local action is critical in environmental management (e.g. Cash
et al. 2003, Ostrom 2005, Marshall 2009). For plant biosecurity
in agriculture, it is the action of locals who implement eradication
response plans in a manner that is most appropriate to local
topology, flora, fauna, and climate, and according to place-based
knowledge, local political contexts, and social nuances. The role
of the state and national scales relates to designing and funding
plans. In the case of black sigatoka, there was a great deal of
conflict across scales, to the point that local stakeholders, i.e.,
industry and local state government, essentially rejected the state’s
eradication plan and instead implemented their own project with
industry backing (Peterson 2002, Henderson et al. 2006).  
Our ERGM shows that with 9 local state government stakeholders
participating in the response, their 17 network ties (Fig. 6) were
statistically more than expected by chance, suggesting that in
general, local state government stakeholders were particularly
active in the response system. The ERGM also showed that the
state government head office participants were relatively active
on a per participant basis. However, although the state was active,
the lack of across-scale interactions shows that although the 2001
black sigatoka response was a successful eradication (Henderson
et al. 2006), this success was not based on collective action across
scales. The response processes lacked consistency, and the absence
of preagreed principles for determining cost-sharing across state
and national governments and industry led to delays in on-ground
eradication actions (Henderson et al. 2006, Beale et al. 2008).
Illustrative hypothetical: black sigatoka under the Emergency
Plant Pest Response Deed
In 2005, the state government–led institutional framework in
place for the black sigatoka incursion was replaced by the
nationally centralized EPPRD system (Plant Health Australia
2005). The EPPRD model is underpinned by shared
responsibility, which more clearly articulates roles and
responsibilities for a broader set of stakeholders and includes a
much more central role for the national government in terms of
negotiating financing of eradication attempts. As part of EPPRD,
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new capacities and roles for managing biosecurity were created
at the national level.  
Relatively few incursions have ever activated EPPRD, and those
that have were from contexts and situations sufficiently different
from black sigatoka to make comparisons hard to draw. Hence,
to build a picture of how EPPRD may have played out for the
black sigatoka outbreak, we used a reconstructed data set. There
are limitations in comparing this hypothetical reconstructed data
set with our observed data in any statistical sense because the data
collection processes were different, and we need to acknowledge
that every eradication response is highly stochastic. However, the
comparison is a useful tool for illustrating structural changes in
biosecurity.  
Our key metric for measuring the propensity for across-scale
governance in the response network was the balance between
interactions indicating within-scale compared with across-scale
interactions. For the hypothetical reconstructed scenario, our
results showed that the network contained distinctive strengths
in both within-scale and across-scale interactions. Of the five
types of stakeholders represented, property owners and local and
head office state government stakeholders had significantly fewer
across-scale interactions than expected by chance alone, national
stakeholders had more across-scale collaborative interactions,
and industry stakeholders had more coordinating interactions.
This contrasts with the black sigatoka data, which indicated that
no stakeholder types had across-scale interactions. Within-scale
interactions were also well represented, with property owners,
state (head office), and national government stakeholders having
significantly more across-scale interactions than could be
explained by chance alone. Within-scale coordinating
configurations suggest good conflict resolution and an ability to
reach decisions (Sandström and Carlsson 2008). The across-scale
collaborative and coordinating configurations additionally
suggest that the network predisposes opportunities to share
unique resources, including knowledge, and an ability to build
and reinforce trust (Guerrero et al. 2015).
Scale and Australian environmental governance
Although EPPRD is more inclusive, the EPPRD’s top-down plant
biosecurity approach allows governments to more actively direct
how stakeholders participate in plant biosecurity. In this regard
plant biosecurity parallels broader trends in Australian natural
resource governance (Wallington and Lawrence 2008). Australian
governments are trending away from relying only on regulation
to achieve policy goals and are now just as likely to be one of
several players in cooperative or partnership-based programs
(Lane et al. 2009, Taylor and Lawrence 2012). At face value,
although this approach relies more on institutional collaboration
than on regulation, there is something of a paradox in play. The
paradox of this more collaborative or inclusive approach is that
the broader rules that set the policy agenda, operational
environment, and responsibilities for implementation in which
collaboration occurs are increasingly framed by central
government authority (Taylor 2010). In this way governments are
devolving or sharing accountability for action while often
recentralizing the locus of control of the implementation
apparatus (Boonstra and Van Den Brink 2007).  
These broader trends in Australian natural resource governance
can be seen in our analysis. Our results illustrate the structural
move in the plant biosecurity response system from one that was
locally coordinated, with local industry as a key player, to the
current top-down system, with the national government leading
coordination of a highly partitioned engagement process and
industry being engaged but not playing a central role. It also
illustrates, albeit on hypothetical data, that EPPRD has a
structure that is more likely to predispose better across-scale
management compared with the more ad hoc response to black
sigatoka in 2001. The quality and fit for purpose of knowledge
are more important than the quantity (Crona and Bodin 2006,
Vinke-de Kruijf  et al. 2014), and in this regard how well local
knowledge is used in broader management actions critically
influences institutional outcomes (e.g., Measham 2007). Hence,
although EPPRD better predisposed across-scale management,
its effectiveness will rely on how a nationally coordinated network
can develop mutual trust in the information exchanged between
local and national scales (Juntti and Potter 2002).
Detecting scale matching
What constitutes good biosecurity is highly variable and
dependent on local context. Prescribing a one-size-fits-all
solution is unlikely to succeed (Cook et al. 2014). Instead, a system
with robust partnerships and high levels of cooperation stands to
give the system the flexibility needed to adapt a national response
system to local circumstances. The mechanisms underpinning the
importance of this flexibility relate to institutional fit (Brondizio
et al. 2009). Fit refers to how well the capacities and institutional
structures allow management to be aligned to the natural
resources they seek to manage. Measuring these capacities is an
important endeavor of research (Lebel et al. 2013). When
management has a good capacity to solve problems of fit, across-
scale interactions are one of the results. We took this angle,
focusing on detecting such spatial matching in the interactions
involved in eradication responses.  
Furthering the development of approaches for detecting the
matching of spatial scales in environmental management based
on the structure of stakeholder interactions is a key element of
our work. Rather than focusing on explaining whole-of-network
characteristics, we conceptualized networks as building blocks
(Bodin and Tengö 2012) that can then be meaningfully linked to
theoretical findings from diverse literatures. Our research
demonstrates the functioning of the Australia plant biosecurity
response system, but more broadly contributes to innovation in
empirical methods to study environmental governance for
complex and multiscalar challenges.
CONCULSION
Our analysis builds on novel network theory (Bodin et al. 2014,
Guerrero et al. 2015) to compare the stakeholder response
networks of the 2001 incursion of the fungal pathogen black
sigatoka in Australia with a reconstructed account of what that
network might potentially look like today under the country’s
revised response system. We found evidence that in 2001 the
response was locally driven. There are limitations in comparing
the 2001 observed response with our reconstructed, hypothetical
incursion under the new incursion response system: EPPRD. The
reconstructed data, however, do contribute to our understanding
of changes in the biosecurity system, showing that coordination
now occurs at much higher scales. In 2001 local participants were
very active in the response. Under the new EPPRD, local
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participants were less active, and state and national stakeholders
played key roles in across-scale coordinating capacity. Response
to single incursions represents one distinct aspect of a plant
biosecurity system that more broadly includes temporal dynamics
involving surveillance, containment, and concurrent responses for
multiple outbreaks. Studies that broaden our analysis to consider
the more complete political economy of biosecurity, as well as
building on our structural analysis by measuring capacities for
solving institutional fit, remain two important avenues for future
research.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/7469
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